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ABSTRACT 
We analyse the structural aspects of the banking Risk Appetite Framework (RAF), suggesting an 
operational application in the light of the detailed recommendations of the banking supervisors. We 
develop a quantitative approach that could be used to adapt to the requirements of these regulations 
and that might be useful for management purposes. This approach is empirically applied to the 
balance sheets of the Italian banking system. Our findings show that the Italian banks are generally 
underexposed in terms of credit risk and market risk, so there is room for shifting the risk profiles 
towards higher thresholds with a view to improving the credit institutions’ profitability while 
keeping their RAF consistent with the regulatory bodies’ requirements. The quantitative model can 
be applied effectively to different types of risk, making the necessary adjustments according to the 
particular features of the profile being examined. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published three reports on the topic of risk governance, 
the first of a general nature1, the other two on the founding principles of the so-called “Risk 
Appetite Framework” (RAF)2. The last of the three documents should serve on the one hand as a 
tool for an exchange of ideas and debate amongst financial institutions (and particularly SIFIs – 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions) and supervisors; on the other it should provide the 
former with an easy-to-use tool to support their activities for monitoring and controlling the various 
classes of risk to which they are exposed. In this setting, the FSB developed a sort of guideline - in 
cooperation with other standard setters - concerning the key elements that a RAF should contain in 
order to be effective. 
Given the novel content of the above-mentioned requirements and the considerable impact they 
should have on how banks are managed, this paper further analyses the structural aspects of the 
RAF, suggesting a possible practical application in the light of the detailed recommendations of the 
supervisors. After some introductory comments to examine the dictates of the currently applicable 
regulations and identify some of the associated problems (section 2), we propose an approach that 
could be used to adapt to the requirements of these regulations, that might be useful for 
management purposes too (section 3). This approach is then empirically applied to the balance 
sheets of a number of Italian banking groups (section 4). The last part of the paper (section 5) adds 
a few considerations prompted by the results obtained. 
 
 
2. THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD’S RULES 
The outbreak of the financial crisis has obliged operators, researchers and regulators to see the need 
for banks to formalize an organic reference framework for their global risk management and its 
timely monitoring and control, in order to avoid them taking risks incompatible with their capacity 
to absorb and manage them3. The FSB has responded to this need by drawing up a set of principles 
that banks should follow in developing their RAF and national supervisors have been asked to urge 
financial intermediaries to adopt the proposed guidelines according to criteria of proportionality. 
The FSB’s document was published in November 2013and is organized basically in two parts, the 
first containing key definitions and the second describing the roles and responsibilities of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See FSB (2013a). 
2 See FSB (2011; 2013b, c). 
3 The chronological order of the main documents providing recommendations on the advisability of banks developing a 
RAF was as follows: Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (2008); BCBS (2009); Senior Supervisors Group 
(2010); BCBS (2011); FSB (2013a); FSB (2013c); FSB (2014); EBA (2014). 
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businesses’ various management functions. The first section thus defines the following expressions 
(FSB, 2013b, pp. 2-3): 
• “risk appetite framework: the overall approach, including policies, processes, controls and 
systems through which risk appetite is established, communicated and monitored. It includes a 
risk appetite statement, risk limits and an outline of the roles and responsibilities of those 
overseeing the implementation and monitoring of the RAF. The RAF should consider material 
risks to the financial institution, as well as to the institution’s reputation vis-à-vis policyholders, 
depositors, investors and customers. The RAF aligns with the institution’s strategy; 
• risk appetite statement (from now on “RAS”): the articulation in written form of the aggregate 
level and types of risk that a financial institution is willing to accept, or to avoid, in order to 
achieve its business objectives. It includes a qualitative statement as well as quantitative 
measures expressed relative to earnings, capital, risk measures, liquidity and other relevant 
measures, as appropriate. It should also address more difficult to quantify risks such as 
reputation and conduct risk, as well as money laundering and unethical practices;  
• risk capacity: the maximum level of risk the financial institution can assume given its current 
level of resources before breaching constraints determined by regulatory capital and liquidity 
needs, the operational environment (eg technical infrastructure, risk management capabilities, 
expertise) and obligations, also from a conduct perspective, to depositors, policyholders, 
shareholders, fixed income investors, as well as other customers and stakeholders; 
• risk appetite: the aggregate level and types of risk a financial institution is willing to assume 
within its risk capacity to achieve its strategic objectives and business plan; 
• risk limits: quantitative measures based on forward looking assumptions that allocate the 
financial institution’s aggregate risk appetite statement (eg measure of loss or negative events) 
to business lines, legal entities as relevant, specific risk categories, concentrations and, as 
appropriate, other levels;  
• risk profile: point in time assessment of the financial institution’s gross and, as appropriate, net 
risk exposures (after taking into account mitigants) aggregated within and across each relevant 
risk category based on forward-looking assumptions”. 
 
Although these definitions are in line with the sector’s standards4, they prompt a few considerations 
concerning their content. Generally speaking, there is no clearly stated relationship between the 
parameters that the RAF should consider as listed below, in the sense of a hierarchy or their 
dependence on one another. The document only mentions the comparison that should be drawn on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See ECRS – EMEA Centre for Regulatory Strategy (2013), p. 6-7; Bank Governance Leadership Network (2013), p. 
5-6.  
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continuous and iterative basis between risk profile and risk appetite5. The most important issue, 
however, concerns the document’s failure to explicitly define the concept of risk tolerance, a term 
used in the footnotes as if it were synonymous with risk appetite and risk limits. It is worth 
emphasizing that this notion has not been used systematically (and therefore properly defined) by 
authorities or researchers6. Risk tolerance is nonetheless a necessary and useful parameter in 
defining risk monitoring and control methods and should therefore be included in the RAF. Risk 
tolerance can be identified as the difference existing between maximum assumable risk and risk 
appetite7, so it could be expressed in terms of the maximum allowable deviation from an 
organization’s risk appetite8. 
It has already been underscored that the RAS represents a way of making known in written form, to 
the whole business organization and to all stakeholders in general, what risks the intermediary 
intends to assume or avoid under normal or stressful market conditions, the corresponding limits it 
has adopted and some quantitative and qualitative measures of said risks9. The content of the RAS 
should be adapted appropriately as a function of the class of operators to which it refers. Separate 
documents need to be drafted, depending on whether the RAS is intended for the business 
organization10, or for its various categories of stakeholders (clients, depositors, etc.), because the 
they need different types and amounts of information and they have different levels of technical 
expertise.  
The proposed definition of risk capacity does contain a sort of hierarchy, requiring compliance first 
with regulatory constraints, then with limits relating to the operational environment and finally with 
obligations to depositors, regulators, shareholders, bondholders and so on. 11  While the first 
condition is an easily-identifiable perimeter and various statistical measures can be used to quantify 
it in relation to subsequent “boundaries” within which to contain an organization’s risk capacity, 
there are some doubts as to their measurability and suitability for representing a consistent 
parameter to take into account when establishing the maximum level of risk assumable. As for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See FSB (2013c), p. 4. 
6 This is true, for instance, of the FSB and the Senior Supervisors Group. The concept of risk tolerance was defined 
explicitly, however, in the following works: KPMG (2008), p. 8; The Institute of Risk Management (2011), p. 14; 
COSO (2012), p. 4; Protiviti (2012b), p. 8-10. It is worth adding that risk tolerance was included among the principles 
of risk management by the CEBS (2010). 
7 Analytically: RT = RC – RA (where RT identifies the risk tolerance; RC identifies the risk capacityand RA identifies 
the risk appetite).  
8 According to the supervisory rules established by the Bank of Italy. See Bank of Italy, Circular no. 263 of 27 
December 2006, 15° Update, 2nd July 2013. 
9 On the recommended structure and content of the RAS, see: FSB (2013c), p. 5-6; Bank Governance Leadership 
Network (2013), p. 6-7; Institute of International Finance (2011), p. 24-25; GARP – Global Association of Risk 
Professionals (2013), p. 14-15. 
10 This aspect is considered significant for the success of the introduction of the RAF in business organizations (called  
cascading down). On this topic, see: COSO (2012). p. 19; Price Waterhouse Coopers (2009). p. 6; Institute of 
International Finance (2011). p. 24-26.  
11 On the role of stakeholders in the processes for defining the RAF, see: Cremonino (2011). p. 3-5. 
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most appropriate risk appetite, this must be stated for single types of risk as well as in overall terms. 
There are no specifications regarding how to measure the correlations between the risks, ie methods 
for their calibration or recomposition in relation to the continuous variations that might occur in 
their volume, which could temporarily implicate violations of certain limits12. Partly in the light of 
these considerations, we feel that this parameter should be expressed in terms of a range of values 
rather than a single figure. 
The guidelines establish that risk appetite be articulated by adopting operational limits (risk limits) 
for each type of risk and business unit and for different legal entities, counterparty client categories, 
product lines, or other types of cluster of relevance for a given intermediary. There is no mention of 
the adoption of any so-called early warning system, ie indicators to use when nearing any risk limits 
to enable the timely planning and proper implementation of the most suitable management 
initiatives to return to the desired risk-taking levels13. Finally, there is the concept of risk profile, or 
the intermediary’s exposure to risk, which is measured in instantaneous terms, using gross and net 
figures as appropriate. When it comes to recording this parameter, it is emphasized that currently-
used information technology (IT) systems are sometimes still partially inadequate for the purpose of 
promptly and accurately quantifying an organization’s risk profile, especially at banking group 
level, for different business lines and for different legal entities14. 
The second part of the principles developed by the FSB concerns the roles and responsibilities for 
ensuring the adoption of the RAF, not only by top management, but also by managers of the various 
business lines and different legal entities. It also establishes what the Internal Audit function has to 
do. Generally speaking, the Board of Directors is responsible for approving the RAF - developed in 
cooperation with the CEO, CRO and CFO. Consistency must be assured between its content and the 
predictions of the short- and medium- to long-term business strategy, the business & capital plans, 
the organization’s risk capacity and the compensation programs. The chief officers are primarily 
responsible for transposing the content of the RAF to the company structures; for instance, they 
jointly approve the risk limits for the business lines; they ensure that the business lines have f 
appropriate processes in place for continually monitoring the corresponding risk profile; the 
establish processes for facilitating the metabolization of the concepts of risk appetite and risk 
profile in the organization’s risk culture; and so on. It is essential for the managers of the business 
lines and legal entities to incorporate the content of the RAS and the risk limits in their daily risk 
management activities. To do so, they need to cooperate with the CRO and with the risk 
management function. Finally, the main duties of the Internal Audit function are established, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This aspect was emphasized by the Institute of International Finance in their comments on the FSB’s document 
(2013b). See Institute of International Finance (2013). 
13 The importance of including an early warning system (EWS) in the structural layout of the RAF also emerges from 
the following works (among others): ABI–Bain & Company (2011). p. 47-49; McNish et al. (2013), p. 2. 
14 The Basel Committee has recently discussed this topic. See BCBS (2013). 
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include a number of controls of various kinds, eg identifying whether violations of the risk limits 
have been effectively identified, authorized and reported to the specified levels of competence; 
reporting to the top management on any weaknesses in the RAF; and so on. 
 
 
3. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE RAF 
The effects of introducing a quantitative methodology for defining and articulating a RAF that 
complies with the regulations depend largely on whether a given financial institution has certain 
prerequisites, ie a reference infrastructure that can favor the onset and positive deployment of the 
effects deriving from the adoption of this new regulatory approach. The framework should be 
founded on the following elements: 
− the presence of an adequate risk culture; 
− the existence of a significant interdependence between a business’s risk management and other 
processes (strategic planning, ICAAP [Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process], 
organization, control systems, etc.); 
− the use of effective methods for internal communication and cooperation; 
− the use of sufficiently advanced IT systems. 
Concerning the first element, it is important to bear in mind that the term risk culture generally 
refers to the behavior of people operating within the organization in the light of how they identify, 
understand and manage current and prospective risks15. A consolidated risk-oriented culture should 
facilitate a rapid and effective implementation of the RAF, but this is probably not very common 
among intermediaries, especially when they are not very large. It is consequently hardly surprising 
that numerous researchers and institutional bodies have been emphasizing the importance of 
promoting, developing and circulating a risk culture to all levels for some time now16. In particular, 
the FSB document assigns the task of integrating the new parameters in the business’s risk culture 
to the CEO and CRO. 
From the practical standpoint, the successful integration of the content of the RAF in the bank’s 
day-to-day management presumably depends largely on whether there are already well-established 
interrelations between governance and risk management activities, ie between the risk management 
function and other company processes such as strategic-operational planning, ICAAP 
implementation, the conduction of single business lines and so on. What we wish to emphasize here 
is that any barriers (be they functions, divisions, or of any other nature) to an enterprise’s risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Ashby et al. (2012), p. 19-21.  
16 The importance of a risk culture in facilitating the introduction of the RAF in banks has been mentioned in numerous 
works, both of an institutional nature and in the academic setting. Among others, see: Committee of European Banking 
Supervision (2010), pp. 2–3; Cortez (2011), pp. 48–51. 
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management activities, or the latter’s limited influence on its overall governance, may represent 
significant obstacles to the practical usage of the output deriving from the adoption of the RAF17. 
After outlining the framework of an organization’s risk objectives, it is important for them to be 
reviewed periodically to adapt them to any changes to their strategy and/or market variations. This 
activity must presumably be conducted with a shared effort of collaboration and communication 
involving the Board of Directors, the general management, or so-called C-Suite (the Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Risk Officer) and their respective functions, 
the managers of the different business lines and the whole operational structure. These parties need 
to develop an iterative process of communication, feedback collection and reporting and a shared 
commitment to preventing any excessive risk-taking and to rapidly and effectively managing 
contingencies, improving their ability to identify, analyze and solve operational problems relating to 
risk monitoring and control. A consolidated aptitude for developing synergies between the various 
company organs and functions would contribute to the proper definition and gradual fine-tuning of 
the content of the RAF18. 
The feasibility of precisely identifying the risks assumed by an organization with a level of detail 
sufficient to ensure their effective monitoring demands an IT infrastructure - or Management 
Information System (MIS) – adequately focused in order to capture these profiles (intrinsic in the 
various activities undertaken), not only to satisfy the regulators, but also for the management’s 
purposes. The major international banks’ experiences in this area still seem to be partial and rather 
limited19.  The choices that managements must make in this setting are likely to represent a far from 
negligible challenge, in terms of both economic outlay and regulatory commitment20, the outcome 
of which will be fundamentally important to their effective use of the principles of risk appetite 
schematics and frameworks. 
The different constructs for which we can schematically illustrate the more specifically quantitative 
section of the RAF - ie the RAS - with reference to a particular type of risk, are shown in the 
following figure (Figure 1):	  	  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The term enterprise-wide risk management was coined specifically to emphasize the importance of integrating risk 
management with the other business activities. For a seminal work on the topic, see: Deloach (2000). The matter was 
subsequently developed in operational terms by the COSO (2004). 
18 See Protiviti (2012a), pp. 2–3; KPMG (2011), p. 7; Guorguiev and Gualerzi (2013), pp. 38–41. 
19 Bank Governance Leadership Network (2013), pp. 8–9. 
20 Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) have been set a deadline, in 2016, by which time they must comply 
with the standards according to the so-called risk data aggregation and risk reporting principles. See BCBS (2013), p. 
16. 
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Figure 1: RAS implementation scheme 
 
Source: authors’ adaptation from ECRS-EMEA (2013), p. 8. 
 
Figure 1 contains the definitions proposed by the FSB, integrated with appropriate additional 
parameters. Both tolerance thresholds and the early warning values are used and paired upper and 
lower values are provided in both cases, in the same way as for the risk limits. This is necessary 
because the intermediary must monitor instances not only of excessive risk-taking (upper level), but 
also - given its established risk-return objectives – of violations of the opposite thresholds (lower 
limits) that could prevent it from achieving its expected income results. The ideal position of the 
risk profile would come in between the two early warning thresholds 21. It is advisable to 
distinguish here between the actual risk profile and the target risk profile22. While the former may 
come anywhere within the band defining the risk capacity (or even outside it in extreme cases), the 
latter, to be consistent with strategic needs, should come somewhere within the established risk 
appetite band. Whenever the actual risk profile nears or exceeds the limits or tolerance thresholds, 
various kinds of action must be taken to adjust it. 
The layout shown in the diagram in Figure 1 relies on quantities that should be processed 
consistently with the metrics used in the internal capital adequacy assessment (ICAAP) process. 
This means that, in defining risk capacity in relation to a given type of risk, we can use the concept 
of “capital”, a portion of which (ie its intermediate levels) can be used to express the risk tolerance 
and risk limits. To measure risk appetite, we should consider the objective “internal capital” (in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For these thresholds to be useful, the range of the risk appetite (defined by upper and lower limits) must be 
sufficiently broad. 
22 Note that the concept of risk profile in this second sense can be made to coincide with the desired level of risk 
appetite, while the actual risk profile may not necessarily coincide with the bank’s real propensity to take risks. 
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absolute terms or as a percentage of the “capital” available), while the risk profile could be 
expressed by the “internal capital” actually allocated23. This leaves us with the problem of which 
mechanism to use in deciding reference values for the measurements indicated in the figure and 
especially for the tolerance threshold and risk limit (and for both aggregates we need to set upper 
and lower levels). For the first indicator, assuming that it can be reconstructed in terms of a 
maximum allowable “deviation” from the risk objectives, in its definition we can consider said 
statistical measure in combination with a dispersion index such as the coefficient of variation, the 
variance and the standard deviation. Given their relative characteristics, we opted for the last of 
these24. Based on the mean value of the risk in question and its volatility, we identified upper and 
lower tolerance levels by adding/subtracting the desired multiple of the latter to/from the former. To 
delineate the range of variation for the risk appetite, ie to establish its operational limits25, the two 
previously-defined tolerance thresholds were correlated with the aggregate figure expressing the 
given actual risk profile in question (which was also distributed between an upper and a lower 
value). 
The RAF subsequently developed from the RAS (prepared using the proposed parameters) would 
not only be an effective tool for risk control purposes; with a few simple manipulations, it could 
also become a useful working reference for the company’s global risk governance. This is 
confirmed by the fact that one interesting approach involves assessing the positioning of certain key 
performance indicators (KPIs) aligned with the objectives expressed by the stakeholders in relation 
to the risk appetite and tolerance thresholds (Hyde et al., 2009) 26. 
 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF A QUANTITATIVE MODEL FOR THE RAS 
Method 
The regulations establish that the RAF should indicate all the types of risk the bank intends to 
assume, identified from among those of the first and second pillars and use them for the purposes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The meanings of the definitions between inverted commas are drawn from the provisions of the regulations for 
preparing the ICAAP. With a few adjustments, the proposed reconciliation can be found in: A.B.I.–Bain & Company 
(2011), p. 8. In some risk categories (eg liquidity), reference to “capital” or “overall capital” becomes insignificant in 
the definition of the related risk capacity and consequently of the tolerance threshold and risk limits:  this is confirmed 
by further problems subsequently encountered when aggregating between risks expressed using different methods.  
24 An alternative solution might be subjectively to define a maximum percentage deviation from the risk appetite limit 
established in the light of the Board’s expectations. Choosing a dual tolerance threshold entails using measures of 
variability capable of providing indications of the downside risk and upside potential type. 
25 For the two early warning levels, we might hypothetically consider an arbitrary definition, related to subjective 
assessments. 
26 On the feasibility of using the approach adopted with the introduction of the RAF for management purposes, see also 
Corbellini (2013), pp. 70–76. 
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preparing the ICAAP27. The RAF also demands the drafting of a RAS28: among other things, this 
document provides a summary of the quantitative measures of the risk that a financial institution is 
willing to accept, or that it intends to limit, for the purposes of achieving its business objectives. 
In this setting, the present work proposes a quantitative model for drafting a RAS that was applied 
to the financial statements of 15 Italian banking groups for the period from 2008 to 2013 (n = 6). 
The resulting RAS were subsequently analyzed to obtain a rough outline of a RAF suitable for use 
by an internal analyst, but also (and more importantly) by an external analyst interested in knowing 
the position of financial institutions in terms of their propensity to accept or avoid the main types of 
risk to which they are exposed. We thus propose to overcome several already-identified 
shortcomings that are: normative (failure to provide in Pillar III of Basel II for the information 
deriving from the ICAAP to be communicated to the market); methodological (the lack of a 
quantitative model for reference in constructing a RAF); and academic (researchers’ inadequate 
attention to the topic of banks’ risk appetite).  
 
The model used to draft the RAS considers three risks regulated as part of Pillar I of Basel II, ie the 
counterparty and credit risk (j = 1); the operational risk (j = 2); and the market risk (j = 3). For these 
three types of risk, we consider the specific minimum capital requirements (MCR) that each bank 
must meet according to the dictates of Pillar I and we examine how they correlate with their Tier 1 
and regulatory capital. For each bank, we also consider the minimum total capital requirements 
(TCR), calculated as the sum of the capital requirements for each type of risk considered. The TCR 
are likewise placed in relation to Tier 1 and regulatory capital, identifying the overall “weight” of 
the risks vis-à-vis the bank’s capital. We thus aim to underscore the influence of the minimum 
capital requirements on the regulatory capital by specifying tolerance thresholds within which the 
credit institutions examined should keep these weights. Risk appetite statements drafted in this way 
would serve the purpose of identifying the banks’ current situation in relation to the “consumption” 
of their capital by the three types of risk considered. 
In detail, the variables comprising the RAS (see Figure 1) are constructed as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For some risk categories (eg reputation), but also for all the so-called “pure” risks in general, it is hard to imagine a 
bank having a particular “appetite”, since no economic returns can derive from accepting such risks. In such cases, 
unless the risks are “quantifiable”, it would be better to define a generic “tolerance”, expressed in mainly qualitative 
terms. 
28 See FSB (2013c). p. 2. 
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RTui, j = µ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ +σ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
RTli, j = µ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ −σ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥                    (1)
29 
 
where 
RTui.j ;(RTli.j) = Risk Tolerance upper level (lower level) of the i-th bank with respect to the j-th 
risk, with i = 1-15 and j = 1-3; 
µ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ 	  = mean of the ratio between the Minimum Capital Requirements of the i-th bank with 
respect to the j-th risk (MCRi,j) and the Tier 1 (going-concern capital) of the i-th bank (Tier1i), 
covering the period 2008-2013 (n = 6); 
σ
MCRi, j
Tier1i
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ 	  = standard deviation of the ratio between the Minimum Capital Requirements of the   
i-th bank with respect to the j-th risk (MCRi,j.)and the Tier 1 (going-concern capital) of the i-th bank 
(Tier1i), covering the period 2008-2013 (n = 6). 
 
 
RLui, j =
RTui, j MCRi, j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
RTui Tier1i[ ]
RLli, j =
RTli, j MCRi, j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
RTli Tier1i[ ]
                    (2)30 
where 
RLui, j;(RLli, j ) 	  =	  Risk Limit upper level (lower level) of the i-th bank with respect to the j-th risk, 
with i = 1-15 and j = 1-3; 
RTui, j;(RTli, j ) MCRi, j⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ 	  =	   Risk Tolerance upper level (lower level) of the Minimum Capital 
Requirements of the i-th bank with respect to the j-th risk, calculated as sum (difference) between 
the mean of the MCRi,j, covering the period 2008-2013 (n = 6) and the corresponding standard 
deviation (i = 1-15, j = 1-3); 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Only the tolerance thresholds are estimated by referring to conditions of normal operativity: the corresponding values 
applicable to situations of stress could be fixed by considering simple percentage increments (eg ± 10% for the upper 
and lower levels). The formula is applied in the same way to the regulatory capital (RC), substituting Tier1 in the 
denominator of the ratios. 
30 The risk limits are placed symmetrically in relation to the tolerance thresholds (a different risk propensity could be 
apparent from differently spaced limits for the tolerance thresholds). 
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RTui;(RTli ) Tier1i[ ] 	  =	   Risk Tolerance upper level (lower level) of the Tier1 of the i-th bank 
calculated as sum (difference) between the mean of the Tier1 covering the period 2008-2013 (n = 6) 
and the corresponding standard deviation (i = 1-15). 
 
 
EWui, j = RLui, j − 2b.p.
EWli, j = RLli, j + 2b.p.
            (3) 
where 
EWui,j; (EWli,j) = Early Warning upper level (lower level) of the i-th bank with respect to the j-th 
risk, with i = 1-15 and j = 1-3; 
RLui.j;(RLli.j) = Risk Limit upper level (lower level) of the i-th bank with respect to the j-th risk, 
with i = 1-15 and j = 1-3 
2b.p. = two basis points (0.02%)31. 
 
By way of example, we provide data for drafting the RAS of one of the banking groups analyzed 
(Table A.1) in Annex 1. 
 
Dataset 
The model for drafting an ICAAP-compliant RAS was applied to 15 Italian banking groups, 
comprising the first five groups and all the so-called “large” institutions32. This sample has a market 
share of 69.80% (calculated on the basis of loans to customers). We disregarded credit institutions 
involved in activities other than those of the “commercial banks” (eg corporate banking, investment 
banking, etc.) and groups that were in receivership at the time of our analysis. 
We considered the consolidated financial statements as at 31 December for the years 2008-2013. 
For each group, we drafted a RAS with reference to 8 indicators 33: 
• total capital requirements / core capital (TCRi/Tier1i); 
• total capital requirements / regulatory capital (TCRi/RCi); 
• minimum capital requirements for counterparty and credit risk / core capital (MCRi,1/Tier1i); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The early warning values were arbitrarily set at 2 base points below and above the upper and lower risk limits. 
Different values can be used, based on internal estimates and different types of risk. In fact, there could be a wider 
margin between the early warning threshold and the risk limits for risk categories coming to bear less on the first pillar. 
To use the same range for all risks, we could set the early warning threshold at a distance from the risk limit 
corresponding to a given percentage (eg 30%). 
32 The dimensional groupings classify banking groups and banks belonging to groups or operating independently as 
“large” if they have total intermediated funds in excess of €21.5 billion. See Bank of Italy (2014), p. 249. 
33 Before drafting the RAS the data obtained for each indicator were normalized to rule out any presence of outliers. 
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• minimum capital requirements for counterparty and credit risk / regulatory capital 
(MCRi,1/RCi); 
• minimum capital requirements for operational risk / core capital (MCRi,2/Tier1i); 
• minimum capital requirements for operational risk / regulatory capital (MCRi,2/RCi); 
• minimum capital requirements for market risk / core capital (MCRi,3/Tier1i); 
• minimum capital requirements for market risk / regulatory capital (MCRi,3/RCi). 
The resulting statements were analyzed using a between-groups comparison to establish the RAF34 
for the Italian banking system as a whole. Then a RAF was prepared for the groups revealing 
critical situations. Below we discuss the main evidence emerging from our analysis of the banking 
system and of the groups considered most significant. The RAS for each group are attached in 
Annex 1. 
 
Main findings 
 
Analysis of the banking system  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - RAS for the Italian banking system (2008-2013) 
TCRItaly/Tier1Italy Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 108.40% 105.84% 14.486% 2.098% 128.235% 78.536% 0.595 
RLu 100.61% 101.04% 13.205% 1.744% 125.992% 75.267% 0.521 
EWu 100.59% 101.02% 13.205% 1.744% 125.972% 75.247% 0.521 
Ewl 92.87% 93.30% 13.784% 1.900% 123.947% 68.719% 0.503 
RLl 92.85% 93.28% 13.784% 1.900% 123.927% 68.699% 0.503 
RTl 86.41% 89.08% 14.841% 2.202% 121.750% 64.870% 0.538 
Values as at 31.12.2013 89.39% 86.83% 20.698% 4.284% 137.109% 60.477% 0.557 
RiskTarget 96.73% 96.93% 13.334% 1.778% 124.960% 72.448% 0.509 
RiskGap 7.34% 9.16% 12.728% 1.620% 26.943% -25.097% 0.505 
TCRItaly/RCItaly Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 76.82% 74.49% 7.982% 0.637% 92.164% 60.980% 0.512 
RLu 72.85% 70.89% 8.410% 0.707% 89.109% 58.836% 0.557 
EWu 72.83% 70.87% 8.410% 0.707% 89.089% 58.816% 0.557 
EWl 67.99% 68.48% 8.489% 0.721% 86.446% 55.891% 0.568 
RLl 67.97% 68.46% 8.489% 0.721% 86.426% 55.871% 0.568 
RTl 64.51% 64.66% 9.213% 0.849% 83.558% 49.255% 0.540 
Values as at 31.12.2013 66.38% 65.69% 12.649% 1.600% 87.207% 42.297% 0.565 
RiskTarget 70.41% 68.72% 8.295% 0.688% 87.767% 57.354% 0.551 
RiskGap 4.03% 4.86% 7.157% 0.512% 17.161% -11.928% 0.494 
MCRItaly,1/Tier1Italy Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
Rtu 99.14% 97.00% 15.398% 2.371% 121.662% 70.303% 0.604 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See FSB (2013c), p. 2. 
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RLu 91.67% 92.08% 14.095% 1.987% 118.292% 65.909% 0.538 
EWu 91.65% 92.06% 14.095% 1.987% 118.272% 65.889% 0.538 
EWl 83.40% 83.55% 14.252% 2.031% 115.273% 59.543% 0.517 
RLl 83.38% 83.53% 14.252% 2.031% 115.253% 59.523% 0.517 
RTl 77.44% 82.78% 15.671% 2.456% 113.453% 55.547% 0.558 
Values as at 31.12.2013 79.30% 79.82% 21.144% 4.470% 125.633% 53.670% 0.614 
RiskTarget 87.52% 88.81% 13.901% 1.932% 116.772% 62.716% 0.516 
RiskGap 8.22% 9.05% 13.140% 1.727% 28.037% -24.768% 0.514 
MCRItaly,1/RCItaly Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 70.26% 70.68% 8.363% 0.699% 86.220% 53.177% 0.506 
RLu 66.69% 65.05% 8.330% 0.694% 82.872% 51.521% 0.532 
EWu 66.67% 65.03% 8.330% 0.694% 82.852% 51.501% 0.532 
EWl 60.75% 61.95% 9.809% 0.962% 81.164% 46.606% 0.577 
RLl 60.73% 61.93% 9.809% 0.962% 81.144% 46.586% 0.577 
RTl 57.68% 58.60% 9.986% 0.997% 77.988% 41.628% 0.553 
Values as at 31.12.2013 58.87% 60.31% 13.399% 1.795% 79.908% 38.424% 0.646 
RiskTarget 63.71% 62.75% 8.840% 0.781% 82.008% 49.641% 0.551 
RiskGap 4.84% 5.36% 7.451% 0.555% 15.839% -10.846% 0.567 
MCRItaly,2/Tier1Italy Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 8.41% 8.46% 1.047% 0.011% 10.048% 6.437% 0.582 
RLu 8.00% 7.99% 1.093% 0.012% 9.925% 5.858% 0.538 
EWu 7.98% 7.97% 1.093% 0.012% 9.905% 5.838% 0.538 
EWl 7.13% 7.08% 1.085% 0.012% 9.134% 5.577% 0.615 
RLl 7.11% 7.06% 1.085% 0.012% 9.114% 5.557% 0.615 
RTl 6.77% 6.74% 1.135% 0.013% 8.649% 5.032% 0.628 
Values as at 31.12.2013 7.51% 7.35% 1.580% 0.025% 10.394% 4.447% 0.532 
RiskTarget 7.56% 7.68% 1.056% 0.011% 9.340% 5.843% 0.604 
RiskGap 0.05% 0.42% 0.971% 0.009% 1.688% -1.614% 0.588 
MCRItaly,2/RCItaly Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 6.09% 6.21% 0.685% 0.005% 7.267% 4.945% 0.591 
RLu 5.78% 5.72% 0.792% 0.006% 7.101% 4.334% 0.573 
EWu 5.76% 5.70% 0.792% 0.006% 7.081% 4.314% 0.573 
EWl 5.25% 5.05% 0.702% 0.005% 6.396% 4.031% 0.594 
RLl 5.23% 5.03% 0.702% 0.005% 6.376% 4.011% 0.594 
RTl 4.96% 4.78% 0.788% 0.006% 6.227% 3.429% 0.566 
Values as at 31.12.2013 5.60% 5.45% 1.085% 0.012% 7.218% 3.110% 0.541 
RiskTarget 5.51% 5.40% 0.734% 0.005% 6.738% 4.173% 0.573 
RiskGap -0.10% 0.11% 0.682% 0.005% 1.062% -1.431% 0.548 
MCRItaly,3/Tier1Italy Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 3.15% 2.09% 2.400% 0.058% 9.260% 0.829% 0.637 
RLu 2.78% 1.90% 2.141% 0.046% 8.024% 0.733% 0.653 
EWu 2.76% 1.88% 2.141% 0.046% 8.004% 0.713% 0.653 
EWl 1.65% 1.24% 1.417% 0.020% 5.499% 0.020% 0.566 
RLl 1.63% 1.22% 1.417% 0.020% 5.479% 0.000% 0.566 
RTl 1.44% 1.04% 1.345% 0.018% 5.211% 0.000% 0.578 
Values as at 31.12.2013 1.73% 1.16% 1.547% 0.024% 5.783% 0.048% 0.593 
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RiskTarget 2.20% 1.49% 1.605% 0.026% 5.856% 0.465% 0.637 
RiskGap 0.48% 0.31% 0.918% 0.008% 3.395% -0.385% 0.579 
MCRItaly,3/RCItaly Mean Median σ  σ2 Max Min σ /σMAX 
RTu 2.26% 1.60% 1.690% 0.029% 6.887% 0.675% 0.623 
RLu 2.02% 1.34% 1.498% 0.022% 5.806% 0.634% 0.654 
EWu 2.00% 1.32% 1.498% 0.022% 5.786% 0.614% 0.654 
EWl 1.19% 0.89% 1.010% 0.010% 3.752% 0.020% 0.583 
RLl 1.17% 0.87% 1.010% 0.010% 3.732% 0.000% 0.583 
RTl 1.05% 0.74% 0.963% 0.009% 3.593% 0.000% 0.589 
Values as at 31.12.2013 1.30% 0.86% 1.153% 0.013% 4.042% 0.033% 0.619 
RiskTarget 1.60% 1.10% 1.120% 0.013% 3.802% 0.319% 0.667 
RiskGap 0.30% 0.19% 0.670% 0.004% 2.447% -0.448% 0.528 
Source: financial statement data processed by the authors. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of drafting the RAS for the Italian banking system, with the mean values 
(“Mean”) of the indicators calculated for each group. 
Concerning the ratio of total capital requirements to core capital (TCRItaly/Tier1Italy), the Italian 
banks have tolerance thresholds in the range of 108.40%35 to 86.41%, while the risk profile is 
identified by upper and lower risk limit values (RLu-RLl) of 100.61% and 92.85%. As at 31 
December 2013 the national banking system had a TCRItaly/Tier1Italy ratio of 89.39%. Assuming that 
the “target” risk profile (“RiskTarget”) coincides with the mean value of the risk profile (96.73%), 
we have a positive risk gap of 7.34%. This difference can be interpreted as an additional margin of 
overall risk that the banks could assume - without departing from the regulators’ requirements for a 
prudent risk profile - with a view to achieving a greater profitability and a consequent growth. 
The same considerations apply to the ratio of total capital requirements to total regulatory capital 
(TCRItaly/RCItaly). In this case, the tolerance thresholds range between a maximum of 76.82% and a 
minimum of 64.51%, while the risk profile comes between risk limits of 72.85% and 67.97%. If we 
look at the risk target (70.41%) and the values as at 31 December 2013 (66.38%), the risk gap 
remains positive (albeit by only 4.03%), confirming that there is room for Italian banks to assume 
greater risks. 
 
To see what types of risk the Italian banking system might increase its exposure to without 
negatively influencing its overall solidity, we can analyze the RAS for the “First Pillar” risks 
(counterparty and credit risk, operational risk, market risk). The ratio between the minimum capital 
requirements for counterparty and credit risk and the core capital (MCRItaly,1/Tier1Italy) lies within a 
range of tolerance thresholds between 99.14% and 77.44%, while the risk profile comes between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 It is allowable for the upper tolerance threshold of the MCR to be higher than Tier1 (values of the indicators with 
Tier1 as the denominator greater than 100%), providing this threshold is lower than the total regulatory capital. 
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91.67% and 83.38%. Comparing the risk target (87.52%) with the value of this ratio as at 31 
December 2013 (79.30%), we find a positive risk gap of 8.22%. So, Italian banks could increase the 
“weight” of their minimum core capital requirements for counterparty and credit risk by taking on 
additional counterparty and credit risk - by distributing loans, for instance. As for their total 
regulatory capital, the positive margin available to the banking system amounts to 4.84%.  
Turning to the operational risk, we see a marked reduction in the positive gap and even some 
evidence of a negative gap, pointing to the need to reduce the weight of this type of risk on the total 
regulatory capital. In fact, if we compare the risk target relating to the MCRItaly,2/Tier1Italy ratio 
(7.56%) with the value of this ratio as at 31 December 2013 (7.51%), the margin available for a 
further increase in the weight of the operational risk on the bank’s core capital amounts to just 
0.04%. Comparing the risk target relating to the MCRItaly,2/RCItaly ratio (5.51%) with the 
corresponding value as at the end of December 2013 (5.60%) gives us a negative risk gap (-0.10%), 
meaning that the weight of the operational risk on the banks’ capital needs to be reduced. 
As for the market risk, the Italian banks’ risk gap calculated as at 31 December 2013 reveals a 
positive margin for both the MCRItaly,3/Tier1Italy ratio (0.48%)and the MCRItaly,3/RCItaly ratio (0.30%). 
 
Analyzing the RAS as a whole, we can say that the Italian banking system is generally 
underexposed in terms of credit risk and market risk and the positive margins identified mean that it 
could raise its risk thresholds - thereby contributing to the institutions’ profitability - while keeping 
their RAF consistent with the regulations. 
These considerations are applicable to the system’s “mean” level, but our analysis would be more 
meaningful at single group level because drafting the RAS brought to light situations that 
sometimes differed considerably from one another and from the system as a whole. This was 
confirmed by the fact that the standard deviation (σ) and relative variability index “σ/σMAX”36 for 
the indicators as at 31 December 2013 (“values as at 31.12.2013”) have higher values than the other 
elements in each RAS, revealing significant differences between the single banking groups. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The relative variability indexes are uninfluenced by the unit of measure; they enable comparisons between 
distributions with different means; and they are not influenced by the intensity of the trait. One such index is the ratio 
between an index and its maximum value. Since the maximum possible theoretical value of an absolute variability 
index is infinitely large, we have to refer to a maximum in which the minimum and maximum of the modalities is fixed. 
For the standard deviation, the minimum l and maximum L of the modalities are assumed to be known. The maximizing 
distribution (ie the one with the maximum variability) must have the same mean (M) as the distribution considered. We 
thus obtain the following formula: σ/σMAX = σ/√(M-l)(L-M). This index varies between 0 and 1: it is 0 in the absence 
of variability and 1 in the event of a maximum variability, subject to the imposed constraints. 
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Analysis of individual banking groups  
Table 2: RAS for the Veneto Banca Group (VB) 
RAS Indicators TCRVB/Tier1VB TCRVB/RCVB MCRVB,1/Tier1VB MCRVB,1/RCVB 
RTu 104.82% 82.24% 95.38% 75.00% 
RLu 99.85% 76.42% 91.27% 69.86% 
EWu 99.83% 76.40% 91.25% 69.84% 
EWl 99.32% 72.32% 89.97% 65.51% 
RLl 99.30% 72.30% 89.95% 65.49% 
RTl 94.61% 67.05% 86.07% 60.86% 
Values as at 31.12.2013 103.99% 86.29% 94.62% 78.52% 
RiskTarget 99.57% 74.36% 90.61% 67.67% 
RiskGap -4.41% -11.93% -4.02% -10.85% 
RAS Indicators MCRVB,2/Tier1VB MCRVB,2/RCVB MCRVB,3/Tier1VB MCRVB,3/RCVB 
RTu 7.77% 6.21% 1.76% 1.24% 
RLu 7.47% 5.72% 1.55% 1.13% 
EWu 7.45% 5.70% 1.53% 1.11% 
EWl 6.93% 5.05% 1.41% 1.08% 
RLl 6.91% 5.03% 1.39% 1.06% 
RTl 6.63% 4.61% 1.23% 0.97% 
Values as at 31.12.2013 8.20% 6.81% 1.16% 0.96% 
RiskTarget 7.19% 5.37% 1.47% 1.10% 
RiskGap -1.01% -1.43% 0.31% 0.13% 
Source: financial statement data processed by the authors. 
 
Table 2 shows the RAS for the “Veneto Banca” Group (VB) drafted from an ICAAP-compliant 
standpoint on the basis of the previously-listed indicators. The VB is distinctive in that, as at 31 
December 2013, it exceeded the upper tolerance threshold for six of the eight indicators, revealing 
severe criticalities in terms of its risk-taking activities eroding its capital. In fact, the TCRVB/Tier1VB 
and TCRVB/RCVB ratios show that, with risk targets of 99.57% and 74.36%, respectively, the group 
has negative risk gaps amounting to -4.41% and -11.93%. Not only does the group’s risk exposure 
exceed its risk profile range (between the upper and lower risk limits), it even exceeds the tolerance 
threshold, which is the maximum allowable deviation from its risk appetite. In the opinion of the 
present authors, these gaps indicate the urgent need to take steps designed to reduce the weight of 
the risks on the bank’s capital, given the erosion of the fixed margins needed to operate even in 
conditions of stress. In particular, a look at the MCRVB,1/RCVB ratio shows the need to reduce the 
weight of the counterparty and credit risk on the regulatory capital, where there is a risk gap of -
10.85%. The same applies to the weight of the operational risk on the regulatory capital 
(MCRVB,2/RCVB), where exceeding the upper tolerance threshold has generated a negative gap vis-à-
vis the target risk of -1.43%, revealing a markedly critical situation for the group’s capital solidity. 
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Table 3: RAS for the Creval Group (CR) 
RAS Indicators TCRCR/Tier1CR TCRCR/RCCR MCRCR,1/Tier1CR MCRCR,1/RCCR 
RTu 124.83% 84.28% 114.49% 77.28% 
RLu 116.07% 78.44% 106.18% 71.75% 
EWu 116.05% 78.42% 106.16% 71.73% 
EWl 106.55% 74.61% 98.38% 68.89% 
RLl 106.53% 74.59% 98.36% 68.87% 
RTl 99.16% 69.44% 91.31% 63.97% 
Values as at 31.12.2013 92.70% 65.69% 85.11% 60.31% 
RiskTarget 111.30% 76.51% 102.27% 70.31% 
RiskGap 18.60% 10.82% 17.16% 10.00% 
RAS Indicators MCRCR,2/Tier1CR MCRCR,2/RCCR MCRCR,3/Tier1CR MCRCR,3/RCCR 
RTu 9.35% 6.34% 1.20% 0.81% 
RLu 8.93% 6.03% 0.91% 0.63% 
EWu 8.91% 6.01% 0.89% 0.61% 
EWl 7.73% 5.42% 0.40% 0.28% 
RLl 7.71% 5.40% 0.38% 0.26% 
RTl 7.37% 5.14% 0.27% 0.19% 
Values as at 31.12.2013 7.39% 5.23% 0.21% 0.15% 
RiskTarget 8.32% 5.72% 0.64% 0.44% 
RiskGap 0.93% 0.48% 0.44% 0.30% 
Source: financial statement data processed by the authors. 
 
Table 3 shows the results obtained in the RAS developed for the “Creval” Group (CR). Here we see 
a situation that is, in a sense, the exact opposite of the previous case of the “Veneto Banca” Group 
(VB). The CR has values for its indicators as at 31 December 2013 falling considerably below its 
established lower risk tolerance threshold. In particular, the TCRCR/RCCR ratio stands at 65.69%, 
while the risk profile ranges between 78.44% and 74.59%and the lower tolerance threshold is 
69.44%. With a hypothetical risk target of 76.51% the group has a 10.82% positive margin that 
could be used to take on more risky activities. The MCRCR,1/RCCR indicator reveals a positive gap 
(10.00%)and so do the MCRCR,2/RCCR ratio (0.48%)and the MCRCR,3/RCCR ratio (0.30%). While for 
operational risk and market risk the group’s position is virtually in line with its “ideal” risk profile, 
for credit risk the institution should consider undertaking schemes in the medium to long term to 
raise this specific risk profile. 
The risk containment measures that the VB should take are urgently needed to restore its capital 
solidityand thus ensure the group’s survival. In the case of the CR, while it is not urgent to take 
action in the short term, it would nonetheless be advisable to review their policy for distributing 
loans, given that an excessive risk containment could negatively affect the institution’s global 
profitability, gradually eroding its ability to remain competitive and even the margins needed to 
operate in situations of stress. 
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5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
The present work discusses the RAF in terms of a possible practical application of the framework in 
the light of the national and international regulatory recommendations. For this purpose, we propose 
a quantitative model for drafting a RAS using the financial statements of 15 Italian banking groups 
for the years 2008-2013. The resulting RAS are then analyzed with a view to developing an RAF 
that can be used not only by an internal analyst but also and more importantly, by an external 
analyst interested in knowing a credit institution’s position in terms of its propensity/aversion to the 
main types of risk to which such organizations are exposed. 
Our findings show that the Italian banking system as a whole is generally underexposed in terms of 
credit risk and market risk, so there is room for shifting the risk profiles towards higher thresholds 
with a view to improving the credit institutions’ profitability while keeping their RAF consistent 
with the regulatory bodies’ requirements. 
Our analysis on separate banking groups revealed very different pictures and some extreme 
situations. For instance, one group was found exposed to an excessively high total risk for its 
overall risk profile, that even exceeded its upper tolerance threshold (the maximum allowable 
deviation from its risk appetite) and consequently pointed to the urgent need for measures designed 
to reduce the weight of the risks vis-à-vis its capital. On the other hand, one of the RAS identified a 
group with indicators coming well below the lower tolerance threshold established for the risks it 
could assume, making it advisable to adopt schemes designed to raise this banking group’s risk 
profile. 
The proposed quantitative model for first drafting a RAS and then obtaining a global RAF, can be 
applied effectively to different types of risk, making the necessary adjustments according to the 
particular features of the profile being examined37. This particular aspect is worth bearing in mind 
for the purpose of expressing a business’s risk appetite in aggregate and unequivocal terms: having 
no common parameter with which to compare all the categories of risk typically encountered in 
banking activities makes it impossible to have a single indicator that can globally represent the risk 
propensity of a given intermediary. We surmise that the RAF needs to be separated into various 
(quantitative and/or qualitative) sections that identify, for each of the different classes of risk, the 
corresponding total absorption capacity, tolerance thresholds and operational limits and the 
measures and procedures for restoring the risk levels to within the established ranges. The 
framework’s setup and activation relies on certain premises that are not always readily identifiable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Concerning the liquidity risk, for instance, we could start by considering the “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” and the “Net 
Stable Funding Ratio”, but to apply the method described here it would be advisable to consider their respective 
reciprocals, ie the ratio between the volume of net outflows at 30 days and the high-quality (first and/or second tier) 
cash reserves available over the same period (the LCR) and the ratio between stable loans and stable funding, both 
measured for periods longer than one year (the NSFR). This approach would enable the risk capacity with which to 
correlate the other risk parameters to be taken into due consideration. 
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in the Italian credit industry. The present contribution can consequently serve as a useful 
methodological reference for quantifying and solving the numerous problems that will crop up in 
the course of action to comply with the recently-introduced requirements, as well as an attempt to 
overcome normative and theoretical shortcomings identified on the particularly urgent and topical 
issue of risk management in banks. 
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Annex 1 
 
Table A.1 Data for drafting a RAS – UBI Bank Group 
MCR/Tier 1 (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TCR/Tier1 103.5512% 100.5469% 107.1083% 87.9721% 74.1452% 60.4768% 
MCR1/Tier1 92.9752% 90.8058% 98.6526% 81.5164% 67.9068% 54.9391% 
MCR2/Tier1 7.6120% 7.6422% 6.9427% 5.5671% 5.2915% 4.4472% 
MCR3/Tier1 2.9640% 2.0990% 1.5130% 0.8886% 0.9469% 1.0905% 
       MCR/RC (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
TCR/RC 72.1964% 67.1808% 71.6470% 59.2796% 49.9788% 42.2968% 
TCR1/RC 64.8227% 60.6722% 65.9908% 54.9295% 45.7737% 38.4238% 
TCR2/RC 5.3071% 5.1062% 4.6441% 3.7514% 3.5668% 3.1103% 
TCR3/RC 2.0665% 1.4024% 1.0121% 0.5988% 0.6383% 0.7627% 
       Risk Tolerance MCR/Tier1 mean Σ Upper limit Lower limit   
TCR/Tier1 88.9667% 16.8734% 105.8402% 72.0933% 
  MCR1/Tier1 81.1326% 15.2858% 96.4184% 65.8468% 
  MCR2/Tier1 6.2504% 1.2185% 7.4689% 5.0320% 
  MCR3/Tier1 1.5837% 0.7425% 2.3262% 0.8412% 
  
       Risk Tolerance MCR/RC mean Σ Upper limit Lower limit 
  TCR/RC 60.4299% 11.1744% 71.6043% 49.2555% 
  TCR1/RC 55.1021% 10.0772% 65.1793% 45.0250% 
  TCR2/RC 4.2477% 0.8185% 5.0662% 3.4291% 
  TCR3/RC 1.0801% 0.5179% 1.5980% 0.5623% 
  
       Risk Limits MCR/Tier1 Upper limit Lower limit 
    TCR/Tier1 91.9945% 82.8442% 
    MCR1/Tier1 84.1501% 75.3452% 
    MCR2/Tier1 6.3737% 5.8966% 
    MCR3/Tier1 1.9761% 1.0034% 
    
       Risk Limits MCR/RC Upper limit Lower limit 
    TCR/RC 62.5576% 56.3579% 
    TCR1/RC 57.2234% 51.2564% 
    TCR2/RC 4.3342% 4.0114% 
    TCR3/RC 1.3438% 0.6826% 
    Source: financial statement data processed by the authors. 
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Figure A.1: RAS for the Italian banking system (2008-2013) 
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Figure A.2: RAS for separate banking groups (2008-2013) 
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Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
Caption 
 
ITALY = Italian Banking System 
CREDEM = Gruppo Bancario Credito Emiliano – Credem 
(http://www.credem.it/EN_International/Pages/Home_International.aspx) 
INTESA SANPAOLO = Gruppo Bancario Intesa SanPaolo 
(http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/si09/eng_index.jsp) 
CARIGE = Gruppo Banca Carige - Banca CARIGE S.p.A. - Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e 
Imperia (http://www.gruppocarige.it/grp/) 
MPS = Gruppo Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (http://english.mps.it/) 
BPER = Gruppo Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna – Bper 
(http://www.gruppobper.it/wps/gruppo/banca/bper_istzgruppo_content/sitoen/homepage/ilgruppo/) 
ETRURIA-LAZIO = Gruppo Banca Etruria (http://www.bancaetruria.it/en/WELCOME.html) 
BPM = Gruppo Banca Popolare di Milano (http://www.gruppobpm.it/en-ist.html) 
POPSONDRIO = Gruppo Banca Popolare di Sondrio 
(http://www.popso.it/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/1) 
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DESIO = Gruppo Banco Desio (http://www.bancodesio.it/index.php/home) 
BPOP = Gruppo Banco Popolare (http://www.bancopopolare.it/en/) 
CREVAL = Gruppo Bancario Credito Valtellinese (https://www.creval.it/index.asp) 
UBI = Gruppo UBI Banca (http://www.ubibanca.it/pagine/Home-EN.aspx) 
UNICREDIT = Unicredit S.p.A. (https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en.html) 
VENETOBANCA = Gruppo Veneto Banca (http://www.gruppovenetobanca.it/en/) 
POPVI = Gruppo Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVI - http://www.popolarevicenza.it/bpvi-
web/home/englishVersion.html) 
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